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Plaintiff and Respondent,

ASSOCIATED BOLi & SLi'i'i-'* < •
INC., an Idaho corporation, aka J \
R PRODUCTS, A. WAYNE ROBT
SON and FARRELL J. JONES,
Defendants

• ""/ Apm>llunt>

BRIE I- 'H- XPPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
PUdntiff-Re8poiiden.t, \>- Metals \ , steners, Inc.
sued Associated Bolt & Supply <~o. Inc. tor goods sold
on account, fiir'ther alleging that Defendants-Appellants,
Farrell J. Jones and A Wsvm* Robinson, were personally liable for the account on tin* basK ot a guarantee.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The trial court held that the Defendants-Appellants,
A. Wayne Robinson and Farrell J. Jones had orally guarantee the account of Associated Bolt & Supply, that Plaintiff-Respondent had relied on the alleged guarantee to
its detriment, and that;, therefore, Jones and Robinson
were estopped to assert the Statute of Frauds.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Appellants, Farrell J. Jones and A.
Wayne Robinson, seek reversal of the trial court's findings that they are liable on the basis of an oral guarantee
to Plaintiff -Respondent for the account of Associated
Bolt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Associated Bolt & Supply Co., Inc. was a firm selling
bolts, nuts, and other hardware to farmers and small
businesses with its principal place of business located in
Pocatello, Idaho. Assoeiated's original supplier was an
entity called F & R Enterprises, which Associated Bolt
believed to be a subsidiary of All Metals and Fasteners,
Inc., the Plaintiff-Respondent in this action. In 1972, All
Metals and Fasteners, Inc. filed a lawsuit against its
own corporate president alleging that he had been using
F & R Enterprises as a means to sell the inventory of
All Metals & Fasteners, Inc. to Associated at a profit
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for himself. (R. 135) In addition to filing suit against
F & R Enterprises and its own corporate president, All
Metals sued Associated Bolt & Supply and A. Wayne
Robinson, president of Associated. Associated Bolt &
Supply Company had been the primarv customer of
F & R Enterprises, and in the suit All Metals alleged thai
Associated and Robinson had been involved .1: ,-r n»n
spiracy with F & R Enterprises. At the time suit was
brought, Associated^ supply of pixxii icts wa? <*>* '»ff uy
All Metals (R 1 35-1 38)
Early 111 1 973, and not long after -<iui &uit h. ^ « i
filed, certain officers of All Metals & Fasteners and its
attorney journeyed to Pocatello, Idaho to meet with the
president of Associated Bolt & Supply, the DefendantAppellant, A. Wayne Robinson, and a man they believed
to be "the attorney for Associated Bolt & Supply, the Defendant-Appellant Mr. Farrall J. Jones. On "this occasion
it was learned that Mr. Jones was not an attorney but
rather a certified public accountant who bad from time
to tune advised Mr. Robinson in his "business affairs and
had bean the accountant for Associated Bolt & Supply.
Upon learning that Mr. Jones was not an attorney, the
parties resolved to meet again, this time with Associated
r
Rah & Supph having counsel ureses
" U<s~139)
-*•.• -Kjuentlv, in January of 1972, a subsequent meeting vvas held. I' ^-. \ii Metals aiul Fasteners' desire
at this meeting u* l*%i.n whether Associated Boh ^i
ply Company vvas in an> way involved m a eonspirae\
"? k R Knterpnses, and, il not <! >ia- V* Metals'
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desire to obtain the cooperation of Associated Bolt &
Supply to prove its case against its corporate president
and F & R Enterprises. (R. 139-140) It was the desire
of Associated Bolt & Supply Company to assure All Metals and Fasteners that it had not known of any wrong
doing by F & R Enterprises and to cooperate fully with All
Metals so that All Metals & Fasteners would dismiss its
suit and continue to supply it. (R. 139-141)
At this meeting, therefore, Associated Bolt & Supply
made available its invoices and asked its accountant,
Farrell J. Jones, to make available the books of account.
Copies of these records were made available to All Metals
& Fasteners so that they coud be reviewed in detail to
determine what Associated's relationship with F & R Enterprises had been. All Metals & Fasteners at this time
would not agree to continue to sell to Associated Bolt
& Supply until it had an opportunity to review the records, and further it was stated by one of All Metals' officers that if All Metals were to sell to Associated, Mr.
Robinson would have to personally guarantee the account. (R. 140-141) It was disputed at trial whether it
was stated that Mr. Jones would be required to furnish
a guarantee as well. All Metals' attorney stated that the
guarantee should be in writing and that he would prepare
one. (R. 141)
Subsequently, a written guarantee was sent to Associated by All Metals which purported to be a guarantee by both A. Wayne Robinson, president of Associated
Bolt & Supply, and Farrell J. Jones, the accountant. Upon
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receiving the guarantee, Mr. Jones told Mr. Robinson
that he would not guarantee the debts of Associated Bolt
& Supply and the guarantee was put aside. According to
the testimony of defendant Jones, Mr. Jones thereafter
agreed to sign the guarantee, but first Mr. Watts, an
officer of Plaintiff-Respondent corporation, was called
and told that Mr. Jones would not guarantee the debts
of Associated Bolt & Supply, but would guarantee the
account of a new entity, J & R Products Company, a proposed "Joint-venture" between Jones and Robinson. The
term "J & R Products" was then inserted in the stead of
Associated Bolt & Supply on the written guarantee and
the guarantee was signed by Robinson and Jones and
returned to All Metals & Fasteners. On the other hand,
Mr. Watts testified that he was called and that a change
from Associated Bolt to J & R Products was discussed
and approved by him but asserts that this was still a
guarantee of Associated's account. (R. 145)
All Metals & Fasteners did not request any other
written guarantee from either Mr. Jones or Mr. Robinson, or protest the change, (R. 147) Not long thereafter, All Metals refused to sell to Associated or J & R
Products; only one or two sales had been invoiced to
J & R Products. (R. 191)
All Metals & Fasteners brought this action against
Associated Bolt, and Farrell J. Jones and A. Wayne Robinson personally, seeking to recover on the Associated
Bolt account, alleging that the guarantee signed by Mr.
Robinson and Mr. Jones guaranteeing the debts of J & R
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Products was a guarantee for product sold to Associated
Bolt & Supply, and further alleging that Associated Bolt
did business as J & R Products. The trial court ruled
that the written guarantee was not a guarantee on the
part of Jones and Robinson of the debts of Associated.
On the day of trial, however, the trial court permitted
All Metals & Fasteners to amend its complaint to indude the allegation that Jones and Robinson had made
oral guarantees guaranteeing the debts of Associated Bolt
prior to the signing of the written guarantee of J & R
Products.
At trial, Assodated Bolt did not dispute the amount
claimed and does not; dispute the judgment entered
against it by this appeal. Defendants-Appellants Farrell
J. Jones and A. Wayne Robinson appeal on the grounds
that the court erred in holding them liable for the debts
of Associated Bolt on the basis of an oral guarantee.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT JONES AND ROBINSON
WERE PREJUDICED BY THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT TO PERMIT
PLAINTIFF TO AMEND ITS COMLAINT
ON THE DAY OF TRIAL.
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a party may amend his pleading by leave
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of court and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires. Defendants and Appellants Jones and Robinson claim, however, that in the instant case justice was
not served by the amendment.
Plaintiff's original complaint was filed December 29,
1972, and a first amended complaint was filed on October
11, 1973. The case came on for trial September 13, 1974,
at which time the trial court allowed plaintiff to amend
to allege an oral guarantee. Plaintiff made no allegation
that the failure to include the latter amendment previously was due to excusable failure or neglect. (R. 25)
In fact, no excuse or explanation for the tardiness of the
of the amendment was given.
The only evidence introduced at trial to support
the allegation of the new cause of action set forth in
plaintiff's second amended complaint was the testimony
of Richard Watts, Earl Osborn, and Leslie Curtis, respectively major stockholders and directors and an employee of plaintiff corporation. This testimony was at
all times available to plaintiff. Nevertheless, Jones and
Robinson concede that the trial court had the discretion
to grant the amendment unless they were prejudiced by
the amendment but allege that they were prejudiced in
two ways.
First, it is evident that Mr. Robinson, who as president of Associated, was most acquainted with Associated's dealings with All Metals. In addition to being a party,
he would have been an important witness and defendants
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were entitled to a reasonable opportunity to have him
present if the case were to be tried on the oral guarantee
issue.
THE COURT:***
The plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint and desires to have the suit tried on that
basis, which is objected to by the defendants.
(R. 134)

T H E C O U R T : The record may show that
you can't get the deposition of Mr. Robinson
because of his physical condition.
MR. P E C K : Can't get it at this time, Your
Honor but the record may show we have asked
for an extension.
T H E C O U R T : You don't know that you
will ever get it, do you?
MR. P E C K :

No, Your Honor, we don't.

T H E C O U R T : So that if the court tried to
get you evidence, it would be an indefinite continuance until he might get better?
MR. P E C K : Your Honor, all we could ask
for would be, I think, a reasonable period of
time.
T H E C O U R T : This man Robinson, as you
stated, is in critical condition in that his heart
is such that if his deposition is taken, it may
cause his death?
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MR. P E C K :
sible for that.

I would not want to be respon-

T H E COURT:

Isn't that your statement?

MR. P E C K : That is my statement, Your
Honor. And I haven't talked personally with
his doctor. I am relying on what he has told me,
and his doctor's [written] statement.
T H E C O U R T : Have you heard it in any
other way in presenting your evidence on this
second amended complaint?
MR. P E C K : The only other thing we would
be able to do, Your Honor, would be able to
look through it and talk with Mr. Robinson's
wife and see if there might be memoranda of
conversations. I have no reason to believe that
there are any, I don't know.
T H E COURT:
find out.

You have a week though to

MR. P E C K : Yes, Your Honor, but she's
been at the hospital in Spokane with her husband, and they live in Pocatello.
T H E COURT:
(R. at 209-210)

Thank you.

Second, it is evident from the file that defendants
took no deposition and engaged in little discovery. Said
defendants' pretrial preparation centered around the written document plaintiff had claimed represented a personal
guarantee. The tactic of saving expenses and fees by not
taking the deposition of All Metals' witnesses is borne out
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by the trial court's ruling that the written guarantee did
not obligate defendants Jones and Robinson for the debts
of Associated. Defendants Jones and Robinson were entitled to rely upon the first amended complaint as alleging the facts to be tried. Defendants were not required
to engage in discovery in anticipation of last minute
amendments.
The late date of the amendment to include the issue
of an oral guarantee prejudiced Jones' and Robinson's opportunity for discovery on the issues upon which the case
was actually tried. Furthermore, to lessen the prejudice
to defendants a postponement for a reasonable time
should have been granted allowing time for Mr. Robinson's physical condition to improve thereby giving defendants an opportunity to have their most important
witness appear on the issue of an oral guarantee.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT AN ORAL GUARANTEE HAD BEEN
MADE BY JONES GUARANTEEING THE
DEBTS OF ASSOCIATED BOLT AND SUPPLY.
On the day of trial, the lower court permitted plaiiitiff to amend its complaint to include the allegation of
oral guarantees allegedly made by Jones and Robinson.
Plaintiff presented testimony at trial through Richard Watts, a major sitockholder and a director of plaintiff
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corporation, Earl Osborne, president of plaintiff corporation, and Leslie Curtis, an employee, that Jones had
made an oral guarantee at a meeting early in 1972 at
Pocatello, Idaho. (R. 167) This allegation was put into
dispute by the testimony of Mr. Jones who testified that
he had made no such guarantee. The weight of the evidence, however, resolves the disput in favor of the fact
that there was no oral guarantee and that there was no
substantial evidence to support a finding of an oral guarantee, contrary to the ruling of the lower court.
It was undisputed at trial that one of the reasons the
attorney and personnel from All Metals had come to
Idaho was to ascertain to what extent, if any, Associated
Bolt & Supply was involved in a conspiracy with F & R
Enterprises. Certain of the books and records and books
of account of Associated Bolt & Supply were made available for All Metals' analysis so that All Metals could be
satisfied that Associated Bolt was not involved. All
Metals' position that oral guarantees were made is inconsistent with its then pending suit against Associated,
and its desire to determine to what extent Associated was
involved with F & R Enterprises. Thus, at the meeting at
which All Metals & Fasteners alleges that an oral guarantee was made by A. Wayne Robinson and Farrell J.
Jones, it is quite apparent that due to the pending litigation that there was not even an agreement at that time
on the part of All Metals & Fasteners to continue to sup-
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ply Associated Bolt & Supply Company. On this issue,
Mrs. Curtis testified for plaintiff on direct examination
concerning the meeting in Pocatello as follows:
Well, as I recall, Mr. Jones brought up the
subject that Associated Bolt still needed a supplier because they were cooperating with All
Metals and hopefully would be released from
the suit [against Associated Bolt and F & R
Enterprises] and would All Metals consider
selling Associated Bolts, direct selling, which
we hadn't done for some time. And at that
time Mr. Watts said that yes, it possibly
would consider selling, but he would have to
have a personal guarantee before he would be
able to sell. (R. 167) (emphasis added)
A written guarantee of Associated's account was prepared and mailed by All Metals calling for both Mr. Robinson's and Mr. Jones' signatures. At first, Mr. Jones refused to sign, and subsequently signed only when the
gauarantee had been altered to guarantee the account of
the new entity J & R Rxxlucts Company. The reason for
this is obvious. Mr. Jones stated at trial that Mr. Robinson was not a very good administrator or manager and a
poor businessman. The only way that Mr. Jones have
protected himself with Mr. Robinson running the company would be to have sales made to an entity over which
he had some control, i.e., the joint venture, J & R Products Company. Even Watts admitted that Jones had
told him that he did not want to associate himself with
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any part of the Associated name and insisted that the
name on the guarantee be changed. (R. 145)
After signing the written guarantee wherein J & R
Products and All Metals, Mr. Jones asked Mr. Robinson
several times if All Metals and Fasteners had begun to
ship to J & R Products Company.
" I said, Wayne, we have got to—first I asked
him, 'Is All Metals now selling and invoicing
J R?' and he says, 'No, they are not.' and I
says, 'Well why aren't they?' and he says, 'The
next time I go down there I will ask them why
they are not.' and I says, 'Well, its' very important, Wayne, because we have got to cut
this off and take inventory and so forth so we
can have a clean break between Associated
andJ&R.'"
Jones had no control over or interest in Associated Bolt
and could not regulate any of its business dealings with
All Metals & Fasteners or any other entity, and since
he had made no guarantee to All Metals he had no duty
to inform them that he was not guaranteeing the debts
of Associated.
The undisputed facts are that All Metals & Fasteners continued to invoice and sell to Associated Bolt &
Supply Company, both before and after the written guarantee was signed. Mr. Jones imdisputedly refused to sign
the original guarantee and signed only when "J & R
Products" was inserted in the stead of "Associated Bolt
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& Supply Company." The change of the guarantee is
totally inconsistent with any alleged oral guarantee which
All Metals contends had been made previously by Jones
guaranteeing the debts; and obligations of Associated Bolt
& Supply Company. This fact is further substantiated
by All Metal's acceptance without objection of the written guarantee with the substitution of J & R Products
for Associated Bolt. (R. 147)
The weight of the undisputed evidence clearly outweighs the self-serving testimony of All Metals' own personnel which at best was nebulous and very vague as to
who gave an oral guarantee and how it was given. (See
R. 141, 167)
The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff had met
its burden of proof rascessary to establish that an oral
guarantee had been made by Defendant-Appellant Jones.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM ALLEGING AN ORAL
GUARANTEE IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
On the day of the trial the lower court permitted
plaintiff to amend its complaint to include the allegation
that the defendants Jones and Robinson had orally
agreed to guarantee the Associated Bolt account. At the
conclusion of trial the court found that there had been
an oral guarantee by both Jones and Robinson and that
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u
said deefndants were estopped to assert the Statute of
Frauds. The court further concluded that the alleged
oral representations made by said defendants were the
basis of plaintiff's reliance to its detriment:
Defendants have conducted themselves by orally agreeing to guarantee the debts sued upon
herein so as to estop them from deyning the
effect and result of their acts, thus causing
plaintiff to sell its merchandise to Associated
Bolt and Supply, Inc., resulting in the damages to plaintiff enumerated herein." (R. 15)
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, it has been stated:
I t is clear, however, that an estoppel to assert
the statute of frauds does not arise merely because an oral contract within the statute has
been acted upon by the promisee and not performed by the promisor. Neither does an
estoppel arise upon the mere refusal to make a
writing as agreed. 73 Am.Jur. Statute of
Frauds, § 567.
The policy behind the rule that an estoppel to assert
the Statute of Frauds does not arise in the case of an
oral guarantee merely because the oral contract has been
acted upon has been stated as follows:
There is a temptation for a promisee, in a case
where the real debtor has proved insolvent or
unable to pay, to enlarge the scope of the
promise, or to tortue mere words of encourage-
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ment and confidence into an absolute promise.
Moreover, because it is so obviously just that
a promisor receiving none of the benefits for
which the debt was incurred should be bound
only by the exact term of his promise, this provision of the statute requiring a memorandum
in writing to evidence or render enforceable
a promise to answer for the debt of another
was enacted. 72 Am. Jur.2d Statute of Frauds,
§ 179.
This reasoning is applicable to the instant case. There
is no evidence nor allegation that Jones received any of
the benefits for which the debt was incurred, while plaintiff has had every motivation to enlarge the scope of oral
conversations.
Precedent of the Utah Supreme Court further establishes the fact that it was error for the trial court to remove the alleged oral guarantee from the Statute of
Frauds. In the instant case, the trial court ruled that
defendant Jones made an oral promise that he would
guarantee the account of Associated Bolt and that plaintiff relied upon this promise to its detriment. But in
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 (1957), the
Utah Supreme Court held that a breach of a promise as
to future conduct or because of a disappointment of expectations of an executoiy agreement would not give rise
to an estoppel.
In Easton v. Wycoff, 4 U.2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956)
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the Utah Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, extended, to a limited extent, to
cases involving the Statute of Frauds where the promise
as to future conduct constituted the intended abandonment of an existing right of the promissor.
The rule that an oral promise within the Statute of
Frauds will not give rise to an estoppel unless the' promise constitutes the abandonment of an existing right such
as waiving the right to have a guarantee in writing, has
been recently approved by the Utah Supreme Court in
Malcolm v. The Corporation of the President, .....,P.2d......
(Utah Sup. Ct. No. 13553, filed December 17, 1974.)
Even if the alleged estoppel is based upon and characterized as part performance, the rule is nevertheless
clear that an oral promise such as has been alleged in the
instant case is not removed from the Statute of Frauds.
Part performance does not take an oral promise
to answer for the debt or default of another
out of the Statute of Frauds, since neither past
nor even full performance by the promisee of
the consideration for the promise enriches the
promisor. I t has been held that a mere collateral promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another, invalid because not reduced to writing is not susceptible of part performance as between the principal contracting
parties. So as to afford the collateral promisee
a right of action in equity to compel the mak-
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ing of a valid guarantee in writing. 73 Am. Jur.
Statute of Frauds § 468.
CONCLUSION
Defendant-Appellant Jones had no interest in Associated Bolt, and it was not shown that he was to benefit
in any way by guaranteeing the Associated Bolt's account with plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim that it relied to its
detriment upon an alleged oral promise made by Jones
is barred by the Statute of Frauds. An estoppel does not
arise in the instant aise because a promise to pay the
account of Associated Bolt, if Associated were unable to
do so, does not fall within the requirement that the
promise be the abandonment of an existing right.
Morevover, there was no substantial evidence that
defendant orally agreed to guarante the account of Associated, and a reading of plaintiff's witnesses' testimony
substantiates this. (R. 141, 167) The economic realities
of the situation, the wri tten agreement and the testimony
of Mr. Jones all outweigh the vague agreement as described by witnesses Watts and Curtis.
Finally, the amendment on the day of trial prejudiced both Jones and Robinson. Plaintiff's witnesses had
not be deposed, and indeed if they had been, there was
no notice that the issue of an oral guarantee should be
investigated. The amendment to include the claim of oral
promise substantially siffected the issues presented at
trial as can be seen from comparing the allegations of the
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First Amended Complaint with the testimony of the witnesses. Since conversations were a critical part of plaintiff's case on the oral agreement issue, Defendants-Appellants were entitled to a reasonable opportunity to have
Mr. Robinson's testimony presented.
Respectfully submitted,
Earl Jay Peck
NIELSEN, CONDER,
HENRIOD AND
GOTTFREDSON
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Defendants and Appellants
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